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By Steven  P. Zell 
In the January 1978 Economic Report to the 
President,  the  Council  of  Economic  Advisors 
termed  the  slowdown  in  U.S.  productivity 
growth "one of the most significant economic 
problems  in  recent  years."  The  continued 
productivity  slowdown  during  1978  and  the 
sharp decline in  the first two quarters of 1979 
have greatly increased the public's  awareness of 
this  problem,  largely  through  numerous 
government reports and greatly increased 
coverage  in  newspapers  and  magazines.  Yet, 
because  the  productivity  issue  is  extremely 
complex,  its  discussion  remains  full  of 
misconceptions and misunderstandings. 
This  article  begins  by  addressing  the 
question  of  just  what  productivity  means.  In 
the second section, general productivity trends 
are examined, with  particular emphasis on the 
apparent  shift  in  productivity  behavior  since 
1967  and  its  implications  for  the  economy. 
Section  three  analyzes  the  sources  of  the 
slowdown  in  productivity  growth  and  their 
relative  contributions  to  the  slowdown.  In 
particular,  the  effects  on  productivity  of  the 
weakness  in  U.S.  investment  spending  is 
studied. The last section examines the behavior 
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of  productivity  over  the  business  cycle  and 
discusses probable trends. 
PRODUCTIVITY: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? 
As  used  in  economics,  productivity  is  a 
measure  of  the  relationship  between  output 
(goods and services) and one  or more  of  the 
inputs  (land,  labor,  capital,  etc.)  used  to 
produce the output. Both output and inputs are 
measured  in  physical  or  real  terms.  While  a 
variety  of  productivity  measures  may  be 
defined,  that  most  frequently  seen  is  the 
concept  of  labor  productivity,  the  ratio  of 
output  to  labor  input.  Contrary  to  popular 
belief,  labor  productivity  does  not  measure 
changes in the efficiency of labor in production. 
Because other input factors are also involved in 
production,  output per hour may increase  not 
only because of increased labor efficiency, but 
as other factors, such as capital, are substituted 
for  labor.  Increases  in  output  per  hour  may 
best be viewed as reflecting the saving of labor 
per  unit  of  output  as  the  result  of  the  joint 
effect  of  all  inputs  and  the  way  they  are 
combined. ' 
The concept of  labor  productivity  has only 
one input in its denominator and as a result it 
1 John  W.  Kendrick,  Understanding  Productivity 
(Baltimore,Johns Hopkins Press, 19771, Chapter 2. 
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PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH RATES FOR MAJOR SECTORS 
(Annual Average Percentage Rates of Change) 
1947-  1967-  1972-  1977:4- 
Sector  1967  -  1972  -  1978  -  1979:2 
Private Business  3.2  2.2  1.2  -0.3 
Hours  0.5  1.1  1.8  3.5 
Output  3.7  3.3  3.0  3.2 
Nonfarm Business  2.6  1.9  1.9  -0.5 
Farm*  5.7  5.2  2.1  N.A. 
Manufacturing  3.0  3.0  1.8  1.4 
Durable  2.7  2.5  1.2  0.7 
Nondurable  3.3  3.6  2.6  2.6 
Nonfinancial 
Corporations  3.2t  2.0  1.3  1.78 
SOURCE:  Bureau of Labor Statist~cs. 
"From Joint Economic Comrnlttee Report 1979. No. 96-44, p. 56. 
t1958-1967. Earlier years not available. 
81977:4 to 1979:l. 
is called a  partial productivity  measure.  Other 
similar measures,  such  as capital  productivity 
and  land  productivity,  or yield  per  acre,  may 
also  be  employed.  To  avoid  the  problem  of 
having  the  level  of  productivity  vary  as  one 
input  is  substituted  for  another,  total  factor 
productivity  may  be  calculated.  This  index 
combines in its denominator a weighted sum of 
all  of  the inputs used  in  production.  It thus 
measures the net saving of resource inputs and 
the  increase  in  overall  productive  efficiency. 
Clearly,  both  partial  and  total  productivity 
measures  might  be calculated  for  a  firm,  an 
industry, or for the economy as a whole. Labor 
productivity, however, remains the most widely 
used index. In part, this is because labor is  by 
far the largest input, but mostly because it is 
the most measurable input.  Not only is capital 
far  more  difficult  to quantify,  but  there  are 
great  theoretical  and  empirical  difficulties  in 
aggregating the different inputs.' 
PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS IN  THE U.S.: 
WHY THECONCERN? 
Concern  about  the  growth  rate  of 
productivity  is  well  founded,  for  productivity 
growth is the major source of  increase in  our 
standard  of  living and  one of  the keys  to the 
reduction of  inflation. This statement becomes 
evident  when  the  growth  in  real  output  is 
2 In fact, there are difficulties in calculating any aggregate 
index.  See "Output  Per  Employee-Hour  Measures: 
Industries and the Federal Government," Bureau of  Labor 
Statistics,  Handbook  of  Methods, Bulletin 1910,  Chapter 
31;  Jerome  A.  Mark, "Concepts  and  Measures  of 
Productivity,"  in  The  Meaning  and  Measurement  of 
Productivity,  Bulletin 1714;  and Kendrick, for  discussion 
of how these measures are actually calculated. 
Note that the economic meaning of  productivity differs 
from  work  study  measures,  which  compare  the  level  of 
output  to  some  present  norm  under  the  technology 
currently  in  use.  Productivity,  as  used  in  economics, 
reflects not only labor efficiency, but technological change 
and other factors as well. 
Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City viewed  as consisting  of  two parts, that due to 
the growth in inputs and that due to the growth 
in productivity, or output per unit of input.' 
Looking at labor productivity and  output in 
the private business sector, it may be seen that 
from 1947 to 1967, U.S. business output rose at 
an annual rate of  3.7 per cent   a able 1). Over 
this same period, the number of people at work 
grew approximately 1.0 per cent per year.  But 
because  the  number  of  hours  per  worker 
declined  approximately 0.5 per cent  per  year, 
total  hours  worked  rose  only  0.5  per  cent 
annually. The difference  between  average 
annual output growth of 3.7 per cent and hours 
growth of  0.5 per cent is accounted for by  the 
3.2 per  cent  average  annual  increase  in 
productivity.  Thus, almost 90  per  cent  of  the 
growth in real output in the U.S.  from the end 
of  World  War  I1  through  1967  was  due to 
increased  productivity. 
~rowth-  in  productivity  in  recent  years, 
however, has been much less vigorous.  This is 
vividly illustrated  by  Chart 1, which  contrasts 
the growth  path of  actual productivity  in the 
private  business  sector  from  1947  to  1979:2 
with  the  trend  rate  of  productivity  growth 
between 1947 and  1967.  Even discounting the 
cyclical  decline in  productivity  resulting  from 
the 1973-1975 recession, there is no doubt that 
a  distinct  slowdown  has  taken  place  in  the 
growth of productivity. 
This slowdown is further illustrated  in Table 
1, which presents labor productivity  growth  in 
several  sectors  of  the  economy  for  four  time 
This  is an  identity.  Where  Y  is  output,  I  is  input, A 
represents  change,  and  o  is  a  subscript  for  the  initial 
period, 
1)  Y=Y/l.Iand 
2)  AY  = n(YI1) + aI/I0 +  a residual.  - - 
Yo  (YII)o 
For  an  extensive  use  of this  methodology,  see  steven  P. 
Zell, The Growth of Youth Unemployment: Characteristics 
and Causes (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,  1979), 
Chapter 2 and Appendix A. 
periods.  Also provided are the growth  rates of 
hours and output in the private business sector 
for the same periods. The marked slowdown in 
productivity growth in all sectors is  obvious, as 
are its effects on the growth of  output. In the 
private business sector, only the rapid  growth 
in employment and hours worked kept the rate 
of output growth from slowing even more than 
it  did.  Over  a  10-year  period,  the difference 
between  productivity  growth  rates  of  3.2 per 
cent (between 1947 and 1967) and 1.2 per cent 
(in the 1972-78 period) equals  22 per  cent  of 
the final  year's  output  per  hour.  Thus,  had 
output per hour grown at the 1947-67 rate each 
year through 1978, while hours grew at the rate 
they did, real GNP  in  1978  would  have  been 
about  $250  billion  above  its  actual  level  of 
nearly $1,400 billion. 
Some Other Implications of  the 
Slowdown in Productivity 
- 
Besides  the  loss  of  potential  output,  the 
slowdown  in  productivity  growth  has  several 
other  negative  implications.  Foremost  among 
these is a worsening of  the rate of inflation.  It 
may be shown that the growth  rate of  output 
prices is approximately equal to the difference 
between the growth  rates  of  input  prices  and 
total factor productivity.'  Thus, for any rate of 
change in input prices, a one percentage point 
fall  in  productivity  growth  must  raise  output 
prices by one percentage point. 
More  precisely,  subtracting  indirect  business  taxes  and 
subsidies, national business product, Y, must equal national 
income  or gross  factor  costs.  Deflating  income  by  input 
prices,  PI, and  product by  output  prices,  Po, yields real 
factor input I and real output 0,  respectively. Their ratio, 
O/I,  is  total  factor  productivity.  Thus  (from  Kendrick, 
p.76) 
Economic Review  November 1979 Because labor compensation  costs have  increases in unit labor costs on inflation may be 
historically constituted  about three-quarters  of  temporarily offset  by decreases in  the costs of 
total factor costs, the relationship is  also  very  other factors,  in  the long  run  the  price  level 
close between the growth in output prices and  must move with unit labor costs.  It follows that 
the difference between the growth rates of labor  any slowdown in labor productivity is ultimately 
compensation  and  labor  productivity.  This  translated  into  increases  in  the  price  level. 
difference  in  growth  rates,  defined  as  the  Chart  2  illustrates  that  even  at  the  level  of 
growth  rate in  unit  labor costs,  may  thus be  individual industries, there is a strong negative 
correctly viewed as the principal determinant of  correlation between  productivity  increases and 
the  rate  of  inflation.  Though  the  effect  of  price  increases.  That is,  industries  with  high 
Chart 1 
OUTPUT PER HOUR IN PRIVATE BUSINESS ECONOMY, 
1947-79 ACTUAL LEVELS AND 1947-67 TREND 
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SOURCE:  Bureau of  Labor Statistics 
*I979  value estimated. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City .  Chart 2 
PRICESAND PRODUCTIVITY: AVERAGE 
RATES OF CHANGE, SELECTED INDUSTRIES 
1960-75 
Average Annual 9.0 
Percentage 
Change in  8.0 
Output Price 
Average annual percentage change in output per employee hour. 
SOURCE:  Productivity Perspectives, American Productivity Center,  Inc. 
rates of  productivity gain tend to have smaller  worker increases, the quality of labor improves, 
price increases, and vice versa.=  or the efficiency with which capital and labor 
are combined improves.  While  many  reasons 
SOURCESOFTHE 
PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN 
For a discussion  of the impact of this effect, see Hendrick S. 
Houthakker, "Growth and Inflation: Analysis by Industry," 
Why has productivity growth  behaved  as  it  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. January 1979, pp. 
has during the  post-war  period?  Productivity,  241-57.  - 
measured  as ouiput  per init  of  labor  inpui,  Solomon  Fabricant,  "Productivity  Growth:  Purpose, 
Process,  Prospects,  and  Policy,"  in  Special  Study  on  'ltimately  increases  for  One  three  reasons'  Economic  Change,  Hearings  before  the  Joint  Economic 
Either  the  amount  of  physical  capital  per  Committee, Part 2. June 8,9,13,  and 14,1978, pp. 498-531. 
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proposed, they all fall  into one of  these  three 
categories. 
The Work of  Edward Denison 
By  far the most ambitious efforts to quantify 
the sources  of  productivity  growth  have  been 
made by  Edward F. Denison of  the Brookings 
Institution. ' Table  2  reproduces  calculations 
made by him through 1976.  Denison measures 
productivity as output per person employed  in 
the nonresidential  business sector,  which 
includes agriculture but excludes imputed 
services of the housing stock. Adjusting for the 
effects  of  factors  which  affect  productivity 
erratically,  like  bad weather,  work  stoppages, 
and  intensity  of  demand  (a  proxy  for  which 
might  be  capacity  utilization),  a  marked 
slowdown  in  the  growth  rate  of  labor 
productivity is observed,  from  2.7 per cent per 
year from 1948 to 1969,  to  -0.6  per  cent  per 
year from 1973 to 1976. 
Denison  proceeds  with  his  analysis  by 
dividing the sources of productivity growth into 
two  major  categories.  The  first  of  these 
categories,  factors  affecting  input  quantity  or 
quality, has two major components pertaining, 
respectively, to labor and  to capital and land. 
These  components  are  changes  in  labor 
characteristics and changes in capital and land 
per  person  employed.  The  second  major 
category  of  sources  of  productivity  growth 
consists  of  factors  affecting  how  those  inputs 
are  combined,  that  is,  of  factors  affecting 
output per unit of input. 
Of  the  adjusted  2.7  per  cent  annual 
productivity  increase  from  1948  to 1969, 
See  Edward  F.  Denison,  Accounting  for  United  States 
Economic  Growth:  1929-1969,  (Brookings,  1974).  Also, 
"The Puzzling Drop in Productivity," Challenge,  May-June 
1979, pp. 60-62, for Table 2 of the present article. 
changes  in  the  characteristics  of  labor  inputs 
contributed a net of 0.2 percentage points. This 
net  labor  impact  was  achieved  in  three 
ways.  First,  there  was  a  decline  in  hours 
worked-mainly  reflecting a shift to part-time 
work.  Because  the  productivity  statistic  being 
explained  is output  per employee,  this change 
reduced productivity. Second, particularly 
important  in  later  years,  there  was  a  fall  in 
measured output per employee due to a shift to 
women and teenagers making up a larger share 
of the work force. The contribution to output of 
a worker is measured by market value, and this 
differs by age and sex. The third labor factor, 
education  changes,  contributed  positively  to 
productivity  because  the average  level  of 
education increased. 
The  second  set  of  factors  affecting  input 
quality or quantity is the growth in capital and 
land  per  person  employed.  Divided  into  the 
impact  of  the  growth  of  tangible  capital, 
inventories, and land, this source made a small 
net  positive  contribution  of  0.4  percentage 
points to productivity over this period. 
The remaining sources of productivity growth 
as  measured  by  Denison  are  those  that 
contribute to the efficient combination of labor 
and capital inputs. First, productivity grew over 
the 1948-69 period  because resource allocation 
was  improved.  That  is,  resources  that  were 
overallocated to farming, self-employment, and 
other enterprises were moved into areas where 
they could  be better  utilized  and  where  their 
output  was  higher.  Productivity  also  grew 
because economies of scale were achieved in the 
economy from changes  in  the size of  markets 
and  from  specialization.  A  third  factor,  the 
legal and human environment category, had no 
effect in the pre-1970 period, but an important 
negative effect recently. This category measures 
the impact on productivity from environmental, 
safety,  and  health  regulations,  and  from  the 
cost  of  crime.  These  output-per-unit-input 
factors  together were  responsible  for  0.8 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Table 2 
SOURCES OF GROWTH OF NATIONAL INCOME PER PERSON 







1948-69  1969-73  1973-76  (1-3) 
(1  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ADJUSTED GROWTH RATE  2.7  2.1  -0.6  -  3.3 
FACTORS AFFECTING INPUT 
QUANTITY OR QUALITY 
Changes in Labor Characteristics: 
Hours at Work  -0.2  -0.3  -  0.5  -0.3 
Age-Sex Composition  -0.1  -  0.4  -  0.3  -0.1 
Education  0.5  0.7  0.9  0.4 
Changes in Capital and Land 
Per Person Employed: 
Nonresidential Structures 
and Equipment  0.3  0.2  0.2  -0.1 
Inventories  0.1  0.1  0.0  -  0.1 
Land  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0 
FACTORS AFFECTING OUTPUT 
PER UNIT OF INPUT 
Improved Allocation of Resources*  0.4  0.1  0.0  -  0.4 
Changes in Legal and Human 
Environmentt  0.0  -0.2  -0.4  -  0.4 
Economies of Scale From 
Larger Markets  0.4  0.4  0.2  -0.2 
Advances in Knowledge and 
Not Elsewhere Classified  1.4  1.6  -0.7  -2.1 
SOURCES:  Data  for 1948-69 from Edward F.  Denison, Accounting for United States Economic Growth,  1929- 
1969 (Brookings, 1974). with minor changes resulting from the measurement of output in 1972 prices in place of 
1958 prices and from revisions in data. Data for 1969-73 and 1973-76, prelim~nary  estimates by Edward F.  Denison. 
Detail may not add to totals because of rounding. 
*Includes only  gains  resulting from the reallocation of labor out of farming and out of self-employment in small 
nonfarm enterprises. 
tlncludes only the effects on output per unit of costs incurred to protect the physical environment and the safety 
and health of workers, and of costs of dishonesty and crime. 
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rate in  the 1948-69 period. 
The majority of  the increase in  productivity 
from 1948 to 1973, however, is classified as the 
result  of  "advances  in  knowledge  and  not 
elsewhere classified." While  this  is  a  residual 
term, it is  believed  to measure  the effects  on 
output resulting "from  the incorporation  into 
production  of  new  knowledge  of  any  kind, 
regardless  of  its  source;  from  the  way 
knowledge is transmitted to those who can use 
it;  or  from  the  way  it  is  incorporated  into 
produ~tion."~  In 1973-76, though, the effect of 
this  index  on  productivity  turned  sharply 
negative. It is  this shift in  the contribution of 
advances  in  knowledge  that  Denison  finds 
responsible  for  2.1  points  of  the  3.3-point 
decline in productivity growth from the 1948-69 
period to the 1973-76 period. Also contributing 
importantly to this decline, says Denison, is the 
large increase in  resources  necessary to satisfy 
environmental and health requirements and to 
combat crime and dishonesty. 
Technological Change: Some Reasons for 
The Apparent Slowdown 
Two  important  reasons  given  for  the 
apparent slowdown in the rate of technological 
progress  in  the  U.S.  are  a  slowdown  in  the 
amount  of  research  and  development  (R&D) 
work  being  done,  and  the  effect  of  an 
insufficiency  of  capital  investment  on  the 
transmission  of  technology.  Aging  industrial 
plants, the use of  managerial talent to adapt to 
new  government  rules,  the increase  in  energy 
8 Denison, Challenge. 
9 For  further  exposition  of  these  views,  see  Kendrick, 
Understanding  Productivity.  pp.  68,  69,  74; Joint 
Economic  Committee Report  1979,  Report No. 96-44, pp. 
59-61;  Review  of  the  Economy.  October  1978,  Joint 
Economic Committee, pp. 132-4; and Fabricant, Hearings, 
pp. 514-15, 528-31. 
prices,  and  the  slowdown  in  decisionmaking 
due to requirements  for  government  approval 
and permits are also mentioned as factors.'O 
Growth in the stock of capital at a rate faster 
than  the  growth  in  labor  is  critical  for 
technological  progress  and for  the increase  in 
labor  productivity.  New  technology  is  largely 
transmitted to the economy when new equipment 
replaces old and the output of workers increases 
when they have both more and better capital to 
work  with.  Table  3  shows  the  relationship, 
between years containing post-war business cycle 
peaks, of growth rates in labor productivity, the 
capital-labor ratio, capital, and labor hours. The 
decline in the growth rate of  capital in the two 
periods  following  1969,  coupled  with  the 
acceleration in the growth in labor hours in the 
1973-78 period, has resulted in a sharp slowdown 
in  the growth  in  the  capital-labor  ratio.  The 
capital stock-labor force ratio in the U.S. peaked 
in 1974 at $10,604 ($1972) and declined nearly 3 
per  cent  through  1978.''  Partly  as  a  result, 
growth in output per hour similarly declined. 
The source of the slowdown in the growth of 
capital is  a weakness in  investment spending. 
Relative to real GNP, investment averaged 10.4 
per cent from 1967 to 1976, but fell below 10 per 
cent in 1975-77 before rising to 10.1 per cent in 
1978. Even these numbers are an overstatement 
as they  do not  consider  the increasing  share 
that  pollution  abatement  equipment  has 
represented  of  total  plant  and  equipment 
spending (5 per cent in 1977). The importance 
of investment spending as a proportion of GNP 
is  highlighted  in  Chart  3,  which  shows  the 
10 In  "Explanations  of  Declining  Productivity  Growth," 
Survey  of  Current  Business,  U.S. Department  of 
Commerce,  August  1979, pp.  1-24, Denison  is  unable  to 
attribute  a  large  influence  on  the  residual  to any  of  17 
different factors,  including  those mentioned  above. Other 
authors  (Footnote  9)  support  a  major  role  for  R&D 
expenditures and investment on the slowdown. 
11 Joint  Economic  Committee  Report  1979,  pp.  59-60. 
With labor measured in  hours, the capital-labor  peak was 
in  1975, and the decline has also been nearly 3 per cent. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Table 3 
ANNUAL GROWTH RATESOF PRODUCTIVITY AND 
INPUTS BETWEEN BUSINESS CYCLE PEAKS 
(Per Cent Per Year) 
Output  Capital - 
Per  Labor  Labor 
Between  Hour  Ratto  Capital  Hours 
1948-53  3.65  4.21  4.59  0.36 
1953-57  2.42  4.05  4.1 5  0.10 
1957-60  2.45  2.91  2.68  -0.21 
1960-69  3.07  3.29  4.65  1.32 
1969-73  2.34  2.50  3.71  1.18 
1973-78  1.11  1.32  2.69  1.35 
SOURCE:  Bureau of  Labor Statistics. 
strong  positive  relationship  between  this 
measure  and  the  annual  increase  in 
productivity across countries. 
A slowdown in expenditures for research and 
development  is  also  likely  to  have  had  an 
important  deleterious  effect  on  productivity 
growth  and  technological  change.  In  current 
dollars, the growth rate in total expenditures on 
R&D in the United States has declined from a 
yearly average of nearly 14 percent in 1953-61 to 
just under 6 per cent during 1967-77. In constant 
1972  dollars,  R&D  outlays  peaked  at  $31.1 
billion in 1968 and fell to $28.5 billion in 1977.12 
While much of the decline was due to a 45 per 
cent drop in Federal support for basic research 
(partly for defense and space programs), private 
spending  for  basic  research  also  fell  in  real 
terms. " 
Substantially increased investment in tangible 
plants and equipment and in basic research and 
development clearly must be encouraged in the 
12 Productivity Perspectives, American Productivity Center, 
Inc., p. 60, andReview of  the Economy. October 1978, Joint 
Economic Committee, p.  132. 
U.S.  if  productivity  growth  is  to  regain  its 
momentum.  Two  important  means  for 
encouraging  such  investment  are  through  a 
liberalization of the investment tax credit and a 
revision  of  the  current  depreciation  rules. 
Professor Martin Feldstein of Harvard estimated 
that  in  1973,  the  historic  cost  method  of 
depreciation caused  an understatement  of 
corporate depreciation of $25 billion and thus an 
increase of corporate tax liability of $12 billion, 
or 20 per cent. This "inflation  tax" amounted 
to a 23 per cent reduction in net 1973 corporate 
profits.I4  In  comment,  the  Joint  Economic 
13 Note that while the returns on  R&D  expenditures are 
generally agreed  to be  quite  high,  private  investment  in 
R&D is unlikely to be at the socially optimal level because 
of  the high risk of  failure, the difficulty of  capturing the 
full return, and long and unpredicatable lag between outlay 
and return. Thus,  achieving the optimal  investment  level 
may  require  substantial  government  support  and 
participation rather than the declining expenditures 
experienced in the  past  decade.  Review of  the Economy. 
October 1978, Joint Economic Committee, p. 133. 
14 Testimony of Martin Feldstein, 1978 Midyear Hearings of 
the Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress, July 
11, 1978. 
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SOURCE:  Productivity Perspectives, American Productivity Center, Inc. 
Committee noted that: 
"Thus,  under  presently  required 
accounting  practices,  a  rise  in  the 
inflation rate raises real corporate tax 
liability, lowers real after-tax profits, 
and  therefore  reduces  the  real 
after-tax  rate  of  return  on  fixed 
investment. This means that there is a 
direct adverse link between the rate of 
inflation  and  the  level  of  capital 
spending, and this traps the economy 
in  a vicious  circle.  Low  investment 
and  sluggish  productivity  help  to 
raise the inflation rate, and the higher 
inflation  rate  helps  to  keep 
investment and productivity   OW."^^ 
A  high  rate  of  inflation  also  results  in  high 
interest  rates  and  reduced  credit  availability 
15 Review of  the Economy,  October 1978, Joint  Economic 
Committee, p. 141. 
22  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City which deter investment. Furthermore, inflation 
distorts business statistics and leads ultimately to 
the "roller  coaster" behavior  of  the economy 
wherein uncertainty about the future certainly 
impedes planning and investment. 
PRODUCTIVITY AND THE 
BUSINESS CYCLE 
To understand  the recent  behavior  of  U.S. 
productivity,  as  well  as  to  anticipate  future 
performance,  it  is  instructive  to examine  the 
behavior  of  productivity  over  past  business 
cycles.  How  has  productivity  tended  to react 
during cyclical downturns and in the subsequent 
phases  of  the  cycle?  What  price  and  cost 
movements  have  been  associated  with  these 
changes? What can be expected in the quarters 
ahead? 
Productivity in Expansions 
and Contractions 
The behavior of productivity over the post-war 
business  cycles  is  presented  in  Table 4. 
Expansions (trough to peak) and  contractions 
(peak to trough) are treated separately, divided 
into the annual growth  rates for the first and 
second halves of each period  presented. 
As  a  general  pattern,  the  absolute  rate of 
change in labor productivity tends to be higher in 
expansions  than  in  contractions.  During 
expansions, productivity rose in all cases much 
faster in the first half of the period than in  the 
Table 4 
AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OFCHANGE  IN  LABOR PRODUCTIVITY 
(OUTPUT PER HOUR) DURING BUSINESSCYCLE 
EXPANSIONS AND CONTRACTIONS, 
PRIVATE BUSINESS SECTOR 
Expansions  Contractions 
Annual Rates of  Annual Rates of 
Period  Change (Per Cent)  Period  Change (Per Cent) 
(Year:  Quarter)  ~irst  Half  Second Half  (Year:  Quarter)  First Half  Second Half 
194514  -  1948:4  -  3.0  1948~4  -  1949:4  -1.4  5.1 
1949:4 -  195313  5.8  2.7  195313  -  195412  -1.2  1.2 
1954:2 -  195713  3.5  2.2  195713  -  195812  2  .O  2.4 
1958:2  -  196012  4.4  1.3  196012  -  1961 :I  -1.4  2.4 
1961 :I -  1969~4  4.3  2.0  -  1969:4 -  197014  0.4  2.5 
1970:4  -  1973:4  3.8  1 .I  1973~4  -  1975~1  -4 .O  -0.9 
197414  -  1979:IX  4  .O  0.6  -  -  -  - 
SOURCE:  Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Not yet officially designated a turning point by the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
-i 
Economic Review  November 1979  23 second  half.  During  the  first  half  of  all 
contractions,  however,  productivity  either  rose 
slowly or fell. But in the second half of all but the 
last recession,  productivity  rose relatively 
rapidly. In fact, in four of six cases, output per 
hour rose more rapidly in the last half of  the 
recession than in the second half of the preceding 
recovery. l6 
The  1973-75 recession  and  subsequent 
recovery present a special case. As Table 4 shows, 
while declines in productivity during recessions 
are not unusual (they occurred in the first half of 
three of the first five  post-war  recessions),  the 
depth of the productivity decline in the 1973-75 
recession is striking.17 Most importantly, in no 
other  business  cycle  did  productivity  also 
decline during the second half of the recession. 
Similarly, the recent second half expansion was 
substantially  weaker  than in  all  other  second 
half  recoveries,  while  the  first  half  of  the 
recovery was, at best, average. Given the depth 
of the productivity decline, this weakness in the 
recovery  tends  to  confirm  the  belief  that  a 
fundamental  shift  has  taken  place  in  the 
behavior of productivity. 
An Explanation of  the Cyclical Behavior 
During  the  four  phases  of  expansion  and 
contraction,  the  changing  behavior  of 
productivity  is  the  result  of  very  different 
economic  forces  dominating  the operation  of 
the economy. Historically,  as the economy has 
moved  out  of  a  recession  (the  first  half  of 
recovery), output and productivity tend to rise 
sharply.  Capacity utilization  rises  rapidly 
toward  the most efficient rates from the sharp 
recession decline.  Labor turnover  is  low,  new 
hires  may  be  chosen  from  among  a  pool  of 
higher quality workers than when the economy 
16 This approach taken from Fabricant, p. 507. 
l7  Of course, the fall in output was also extremely severe, and 
a  simultaneity  problem  exists  in  determining  causation 
between output and productivity changes. 
is  at  full  employment,  and  the  "fixed"  or 
overhead part of the labor force is spread over a 
larger  volume  of  output.  Rising  labor 
compensation  is  offset  by  rising  labor 
productivity, allowing profit margins to rise and 
further prolonging expansion. 
In  the  second  part  of  the  expansion, 
productivity  growth  begins  to  slow  as  the 
economy  becomes  increasingly  less  efficient. 
Obsolete equipment may be brought on line and 
overtime increases, as do strikes, absenteeism, 
and  turnover.  Selective shortages  of  supplies 
increase,  delivery  times  lengthen,  and  the 
scarcity  of  labor  leads  to the  hiring  of  less 
efficient employees. The booming economy and 
high  profit  margins  tend  to reduce  cost 
consciousness and resistance to labor demands. 
As  a  result  of  tight  markets,  labor 
compensation accelerates at the same time that 
productivity growth slows. Thus, unit labor costs 
eventually start rising faster than prices.  Profit 
margins then peak and decline, new investment 
commitments are reduced, the rate of  inventory 
accumulation  is  lowered,  and  a  recession 
begins.I8 Of  course,  the  phases  of  every 
business  cycle  have  their  own  particular 
pattern,  but  this  generally  describes  what 
occurs as the economy moves into recession. 
Typically, as the economy moves into the first 
half of a contraction, businessmen are unsure of 
the depth  and  length  of  the decline,  or  even 
whether it has actually begun. In order to avoid 
the  high  costs  of  unnecessary  turnover, 
businesses  tend  to maintain  the  size  of  the 
employed labor force during these early stages. 
However, as employment  remains  constant  or 
even  grows,  output  weakens  or  falls,  which 
results in a sharp decline in productivity. 
In the second phase of the typical contraction, 
factors develop that tend to cause productivity to 
18 Kendrick, Understanding  Productivity,  pp. 84-89.  Also 
Fabricant, pp. 517-18. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City rise. Less efficient plants have been closed and 
less  efficient  workers  laid  off  as  cost-cutting 
measures are introduced by  management. 
Voluntary  labor  turnover  and  strikes  also 
decline.  New  equipment,  introduced  as  the 
economy  peaked  and  began  declining,  is 
"debugged"  and  begins  adding  to  efficient 
produ~tion.~~  The  slowdown  in  the  rate  of 
output  growth  begins  to  lessen,  and  this, 
coupled  with  the  faster  cutback  in  hours, 
typically leads to an upturn in productivity in the 
second  contraction  phase.  As  a  result  of  the 
renewed growth in productivity,  business  costs 
are  lowered,  which  helps  to  lead  to  the 
subsequent upturn. 
The Outlook for Productivity 
What  can  be  expected  of  the  behavior  of 
productivity,  labor  costs,  and  inflation  in  the 
quarters ahead? Suppose that the economy were 
to follow the pattern of the typical business cycle, 
and  that  the  present  downturn  should  last 
through the first quarter of 1980. Productivity, 
which fell in  the second quarter of 1979, might 
then be viewed as about equally likely to fall or 
rise in the third quarter, but would be virtually 
assured  of  a  rapid  increase  in  1979:4  and, 
especially,  in  1980:  1.  20  In  the  subsequent 
business expansion, productivity would be 
expected to rise even  more sharply  for several 
quarters, and thereafter rise slowly until the next 
business cycle peak. 
Ifthe last business cycle is the model, however, 
productivity would be expected to fall sharply, 
and  then  at  a  lesser  rate, through  the  entire 
downturn, before turning up at the trough. Its 
behavior during the subsequent expansion would 
be generally strong in the beginning but more 
erratic than in earlier recoveries, with a weaker 
second  half  and  a  greater  likelihood  of 
intermittent declines. 
The behavior  of  labor  compensation  in  the 
private  business  sector  also  appears  to  have 
changed in the last two cycles from that of earlier 
experience.  In  particular,  labor  compensation 
rose more rapidly during the past two recessions 
than during  the  previous  expansion  periods. 
That pattern was just the opposite of what might 
be  expected  given  slack  recessionary  labor 
markets and, in  fact,  the  opposite  of  earlier 
business cycle experience. 21 
Combined  with  the  weakened  recessionary 
behavior of productivity, the sharp increases in 
labor  compensation  also led  to sharply  faster 
growth in  unit labor costs  and in  the implicit 
price deflator, both in the last recession and in 
the 1969-70 period. Given recent rapid increases 
in labor compensation and an apparent shift in 
the behavior of  productivity, expectations  that 
the current downturn might sharply slow the rate 
of  inflation may not  be well founded. Without 
decisive policy actions toward increasing the rate 
of investment, research, and thus productivity in 
the U.S. economy, rapid inflation will continue 
to be  an integral  part  of  the  U.S.  economic 
experience. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Since 1967, the U.S. economy has experienced 
a  marked  slowdown  in  its  trend  rate  of 
productivity growth. The ramifications  of  this 
slowdown are quite serious, for  almost  90  per 
cent of the  growth in real output in the U.S. from 
the end of World War I1 through 1967 was due to 
increased  productivity.  Besides its  role as the 
major source of growth in the U.S. standard of 
19 Fabricant, pp. 517-18. 
20 This date is chosen for illustrative purposes  and  is not 
intended as a forecast. 
21  Approach suggested by J.R. Norsworthy and L.J. Fulco, 
"Productivity and Costs During  Recession and Recovery," 
Monthly Labor Review,  August 1978, pp. 31-34. 
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principal determinant of  the rate of  inflation. 
Consequently, the rapid inflation of the 1970s is a 
direct reflection of the productivity slowdown. 
Extensive work has been done to quantify the 
sources  of  the  productivity  slowdown,  most 
notably by Edward F. Denison of the Brookings 
Institution.  Many  factors,  including  new 
pollution, health, and safety requirements, are 
involved. But the largest source of the slowdown 
in  productivity  growth  is  a  weakness  in  the 
contribution  to  this  growth  of  advances  in 
knowledge,  or  technological  change.  In turn, 
several  researchers  hold  that  two  important 
sources of the slowdown in  U.S.  technological 
progress  are  a  slowdown  in  the  amount  of 
research and development (R&D) and the effect 
of  insufficient  capital  investment  on  the 
transmission of technology. An important means 
to encourage such  investment  in  the future  is 
through  a liberalization of  the investment  tax 
credit  and  a  revision  of  current  depreciation 
rules. 
In  attempting  to  predict  the  behavior  of 
productivity in the near future, it is instructive to 
examine the behavior of  productivity over past 
business  cycles.  Such  a  study  confirms  the 
changing pattern of U.S. productivity growth. In 
particular, while productivity rose sharply during 
the second  half  of  all  prior  recessions,  it  fell 
throughout  the  1973-75  recession,  and 
productivity growth in the subsequent expansion 
was  much  weaker  than  expected.  Labor 
compensation also rose more rapidly during the 
last  two  recessions  than  in  the  preceding 
expansions. If the recent pattern for productivity 
growth  and  labor  compensation  continues  to 
prevail, hopes for a substantial slowdown in the 
rate  of  inflation  during  the current economic 
downturn are unlikely to be realized. 
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